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INTRODUCTION
A two-year-old child falls through the defective floor of a leased
residence in New Orleans and is severely injured. 1 A New Orleans woman
climbs the outside stairs to her apartment, but the improperly attached
staircase detaches completely, swinging off to the side and causing the
woman to fall to the ground injured. 2 A construction worker falls through
the skylight on the roof of a mausoleum and is paralyzed from the fall. 3 A
woman steps out of an elevator into a busy hallway in a Shreveport
hospital, 4 where she slips on a small wet spot on the floor, falls, and is
injured. 5
Under present Louisiana law, those who are legally responsible for the
house with the defective floor, the apartment with the detached staircase,
and the mausoleum are not held strictly liable for the injuries sustained by
the pedestrians on their property. 6 But a current jurisprudential
interpretation of the law would hold the hospital strictly liable for the small
spill, despite the fact that the spill could have been caused by any person
at any time. 7 These hypothetical situations are based on the facts of real

COPYRIGHT 2022, by Andrew B. Young.
∗ J.D./D.C.L. candidate 2022, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
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your support and encouragement throughout the writing process. Also, special thanks
to all those who contributed to this Comment, namely Olivia Guidry, Kennedy Beal,
Brittany Williams, and Emily Hickman. Your insight and diligence were instrumental
in making this possible.
1. See Ward v. Conn., 344 So. 2d 60 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
2. See Jackson v. Tyson, 526 So. 2d 398 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
3. See Sanders v. Woodlawn Cemetery, Inc., 311 So. 3d 496, 497–98 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2021).
4. Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So. 2d 958, 960 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
5. Id.
6. See Ward, 344 So. 2d 60.
7. See infra Section II.A.
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tort lawsuits in Louisiana and reflect a problematic and unjust
inconsistency in Louisiana premises-liability law.
Historically, fault in Louisiana was based on negligence. 8 In the
1970s, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court began to impose a unique
strict-liability standard on property owners for injuries to patrons caused
by hazardous conditions, vices, ruin, and other defects on or in their
premises. 9 In the 1990s, the Louisiana Legislature took action to reverse
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s permissive stance on strict premisesliability, amending the Louisiana Civil Code and passing new statutory
provisions that set out express negligence standards for nearly all instances
of premises liability. 10 However, the legislative action failed to address the
legal standard for slip-and-fall cases that arise out of hazardous conditions
on the premises of non-merchants, including medical institutions 11 such as
hospitals and nursing homes, and the Louisiana Supreme Court has not
since addressed the issue. Today, Louisiana courts have fallen down a
slippery slope by applying inconsistent standards of fault to slip-and-fall
cases brought against defendant medical institutions. 12 Many courts apply
a burden-shifting framework that reflects the outdated strict-liability
standard imposed by the Louisiana Supreme Court before the legislature
restricted the imposition of strict premises liability. 13 This Comment
8. Cartwright v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 223 So. 2d 822, 824
(La. 1969).
9. See Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 444 (La. 1975); Kavlich v. Kramer,
315 So. 2d 282 (La. 1975).
10. Frank Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Burying Caesar: Civil Justice
Reform and the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 339
(1996); see LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317.1 (1996); see LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6
(1990).
11. The issue presented in this Comment regards mostly slip-and-fall
litigation involving hospitals and medical care clinics. However, Louisiana courts
have held that a nursing home’s duty to its patrons is similar to the standard of
care hospitals owe their patrons. See Robinson v. Gulf Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 487,
489 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983); see also Williams v. Finley, 900 So. 2d 1040,
1043 (La. Ct. App. 3d. Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the term medical institution in
this Comment refers to any medical care facility to which Louisiana courts apply
similar premises-liability standards.
12. See generally Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So.
2d 958 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Terrance v. Baton Rouge Gen. Med. Ctr., 39
So. 3d 842 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010); Blount v. E. Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 887
So. 2d 535 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2004).
13. See generally Terrance v. Baton Rouge Gen. Med. Ctr., 39 So. 3d 842,
844 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010); Harkins v. Natchitoches Par. Hosp., 696 So. 2d
19, 21 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997); Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 639 So. 2d 1214,
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serves two primary purposes. First, it illustrates the impropriety of courts’
continued reliance on the burden-shifting approach in light of Louisiana’s
prevailing premises-liability law. Next, it proposes and explains the
suitability of a negligence-based legislative resolution to the problem.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the concept of and legal bases for
premises-liability law. Specifically, this Part will survey the past and
present applications and developments of negligence, strict liability, and
slip-and-fall law in Louisiana. Next, Part II will explain the present
jurisprudential inconsistency regarding the application of Louisiana
premises-liability law to slip-and-fall claims against medical institutions,
outlining the different approaches and rationales used by Louisiana’s
appellate courts—including the popular burden-shifting approach and the
conflicting negligence-based approach. Further, this Part will explain the
issues created by the judicial inconsistency, including uncertainty among
slip-and-fall litigants regarding the applicable standard, inconsistent
adjudications of similar claims, and the resulting legal and financial
burdens on medical institutions. Next, Part III of this Comment will
discredit the burden-shifting standard, explaining its present
inapplicability within Louisiana premises-liability law, courts’ improper
reliance on caselaw through which the standard still exists, and the lack of
policy support for the standard. Finally, Part IV will propose an
amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.6 that will codify the
negligence-based approach and resolve the issues created by the
inconsistent adjudications of slip-and-fall claims against medical
institutions in Louisiana. 14
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOUISIANA PREMISES-LIABILITY
LAW
According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2315 and 2316 are the “fountainhead of responsibility” in tortrelated lawsuits. 15 Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 states, “Every act
whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault
it happened to repair it,” 16 and Code article 2316 states, “Every person is
responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his

1216 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 563
So. 2d 312, 315 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir 1990).
14. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (2021).
15. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 So. 2d 1067, 1077 (La. 1971).
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2021).

2022]

COMMENT

1281

negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill.” 17 The term fault within
article 2315 is commonly associated with negligence cases; however, fault
is not limited to negligence. 18 In fact, fault subsumes negligence—while
all those who are found negligent are at fault, not all those at fault are
negligent. 19 The concept of fault also encompasses the principle of strict
liability. 20 Where strict liability is found, a party can be held at fault even
though he or she was not negligent. 21
A. Traditional Negligence and Strict Liability in Louisiana
In a negligence context, the owner or legal guardian of a thing that
poses an unreasonable risk of harm has a duty to exercise reasonable care
to prevent that harm, so long as the owner knows or should know of the
risk posed by the thing. 22 The owner’s actual or constructive knowledge
of the risk gives rise to his or her legal duty.23 A plaintiff seeking to recover
for the owner’s negligence must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care under
the circumstances, (2) the defendant breached the duty of reasonable care,
(3) the risk and resulting harm to the plaintiff was within the scope of the
defendant’s duty to the plaintiff, (4) the defendant’s breach of legal duty
was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s damage or injury, and (5) the
plaintiff incurred actual damage. 24
In a strict-liability context, a property owner’s duty does not arise out
of his or her knowledge of the risk posed by the thing. 25 Rather, the owner
of the thing is presumed to have actual or constructive knowledge of the
risk solely based on his or her relationship with the thing. 26 If a thing
causes harm, a person strictly liable for the thing can be held at fault
merely because he or she owns or is legally responsible for the thing. 27 As
17. Id. art. 2316. It is well settled that “fault is basic to recovery” in Louisiana
tort law. See Gonzales v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 326 So. 2d 486, 489 (La. 1976).
18. Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 496 (La. 1982).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 497. This rule applies to owners of a thing and any person who
is legally responsible for the thing. Id.
23. Id. “Actual or constructive knowledge” signifies that a person knew or
should have known of the risk posed by the thing. Id.
24. Myers v. Dronet, 801 So. 2d 1097, 1104 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2001).
25. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 497.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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such, in a strict-liability case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence only that (1) the thing that caused damage
was in the defendant’s legal custody, care, or control, (2) the thing had a
vice, ruin, defect, or condition that presented an unreasonable risk of harm,
and (3) the vice, ruin, defect, or condition was the cause-in-fact of the
injury or damage that he incurred. 28
Negligence-based burdens of proof are inherently more defendantfriendly than those applicable to strict liability, especially in circumstances
where limited or circumstantial evidence exists. 29 For example, a man
sustains injuries after slipping and falling in a puddle of water in a hospital
hallway, so he brings a personal injury suit against the hospital, alleging
that the hospital is at fault for the incident and seeking to recover damages.
In his case-in-chief, the plaintiff presents undisputed factual evidence that
he slipped, fell, and was injured as a result of a puddle of water on the
floor, but is unable to produce any evidence regarding the origin of the
puddle nor the length of time it existed before the accident occurred. A
plaintiff seeking recovery under a traditional negligence analysis would
not have evidence sufficient to meet his burden of proof. 30 Without any
evidence regarding the origin of the spill, the plaintiff would be unable to
prove that the defendant had a legal duty of care to protect the plaintiff
from injury. 31 An unproven duty cannot be breached; therefore, the
plaintiff’s negligence claim would not survive the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. 32 Conversely, in a strict-liability context, the court
presumes the defendant’s duty. 33 The same plaintiff would satisfy his
burden of proof by showing that the puddle of water posed an
unreasonable risk of harm, the hospital hallway was in the custody of the
medical institution, and the puddle was the cause-in-fact of his injuries. 34
B. Premises Liability and the Judicial Reform of Louisiana’s Fault
Scheme in the 1970s
As illustrated, a person who has legal custody over a piece of property
and its premises can be held at fault for injury to persons or things resulting
from unreasonable risks of harm present on the premises. 35 This particular
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Lasyone v. Kansas City S. R.R., 786 So. 2d 682, 689 (La. 2001).
See generally Maraist & Galligan, supra note 10.
See generally Kent, 418 So. 2d at 497.
Id.
See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2021).
See generally Kent, 418 So. 2d at 497.
Id.
Id.
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subset of tort law is called premises liability. 36 Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2317, 2317.1, and 2322 are the codal bases for premises liability
in Louisiana. 37 Before the 1970s, the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted
articles 2317 and 2322 to require negligence-based standards of fault
unless a particular statute explicitly required a strict-liability standard. 38
However, beginning with the 1971 case of Langlois v. Allied Chemical
Corporation, the Louisiana Supreme Court gradually uprooted the
traditional negligence-based interpretation of the custodial-liability code
articles, which effectively superseded Louisiana’s traditional negligencebased premises-liability fault scheme in favor of a unique, Louisianaspecific version of strict-liability-based fault. 39
For example, in the landmark case of Loescher v. Parr, a 60-foot
magnolia tree on the defendant’s land fell and demolished the plaintiff’s
Cadillac. 40 The tree looked healthy but was completely rotten on the
inside—unbeknownst to the defendant-landowner. 41 The plaintiff sued the
landowner for the damages to his vehicle, alleging that the landowner was
responsible for the harm caused by the tree. 42 Under the Court’s previous
negligence-based interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code article 2317, the
plaintiff would only have recovered if he proved that the defendant knew
or should have known of the danger posed by the rotten tree. 43 The
36. See generally Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d
175 (La. 2013).
37. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317, 2322 (2021). Louisiana Civil
Code articles 2317–2322 are known collectively as the “custodial articles.” See
Joseph S. Piacun, The Abolition of Strict Liability in Louisiana: A Return to a
Fairer Standard or an Impossible Burden for Plaintiffs?, 43 LOY. L. REV. 215,
217 (1997). Louisiana Civil Code article 2317 states, “We are responsible, not
only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by
the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in
our custody,” and the following articles provide specific instances of liability for
“custodians” of persons or things within their control. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317–
2322 (2021).
38. Cartwright v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 223 So. 2d 822, 824
(La. 1969).
39. See Piacun, supra note 37, at 217–18. According to Frank L. Maraist and
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., “the Louisiana brand of strict liability—requir[ed] a
thing to have presented an unreasonable risk of harm, and presume[ed] the
custodian of the thing to have known of its defect.” See Maraist & Galligan, supra
note 10, at 344.
40. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 444 (La. 1975).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Cartwright, 223 So. 2d at 824.

1284

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Loescher Court, however, offered a new interpretation of fault under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2317—if the plaintiff proved that the thing
presented an unreasonable risk of harm, the owner of the thing was
presumed to have known of its defect. 44 The Loescher Court ultimately
held the defendant at fault for the damage caused by the tree, despite the
fact that he had no knowledge of the risk it posed. 45
In the Loescher opinion, the Court noted that Louisiana Civil Code
article 2317 dates back to the original Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 and
is a direct translation of French Civil Code article 1384(1), which French
commentators and courts interpreted and applied to hold that a person who
is legally responsible for a thing is liable for damage caused by the thing
regardless of his negligence in maintaining it.46 The Loescher Court also
noted that both Belgium and Quebec adopted the French codal scheme as
Louisiana did, and the courts of each country interpreted the custodialliability articles to enforce strict premises liability. 47 The rationale
underlying the strict-liability interpretation is policy based; it favors the
innocent, injured plaintiff. 48 That is, if a third party is injured on another’s
property and both the injured party and the property owner were unaware
of the risk of the harm, the property owner—not the innocent third party—
should carry responsibility for the risk and resulting damages. 49
44. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 449; see generally Maraist & Galligan, supra
note 10.
45. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 449.
46. Id. at 447–48. The Loescher Court stated:
Articles 2315 through 2322 express the same concepts and represent the
same scheme as French Civil Code Articles 1382 through 1386, of which
they are to a large part verbatim translations. . . . In this context, in
applying the French verbatim counterpart code provision, the liability of
the guardian of a thing for damages caused through the vice or defect of
the thing has been interpreted as providing for liability of the guardian
without personal negligence on his part, his legal fault . . . being based
upon the breach of his legal obligation to keep his thing in such condition
or in such control that it does no damage to others.
Id.
47. Id. at 448.
48. See id. at 446.
49. See Piacun, supra note 37, at 220. The Loescher Court explained, “[T]he
person to whom society allots the supervision, care, or guardianship (custody) of
the risk-creating person or thing bears the loss resulting from creation of the risk,
rather than some innocent third person harmed as a consequence of his failure to
prevent the risk.” Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 446. The Louisiana Supreme Court
further elaborated on this principle in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Company,
stating,
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C. Away with Strict Premises Liability: Legislative Reform of the Fault
Scheme in the 1990s
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s version of strict premises liability
prevailed until the Louisiana Legislature passed the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1996, an expansive tort reform bill implemented to supplant the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s plaintiff-friendly interpretation of the
Louisiana Civil Code as used in Loescher and its progeny. 50 The Act
implemented this change by adding negligence provisions into the Code’s
custodial-liability articles, including the premises-liability articles. 51 For
example, the Act abolished strict liability for premises owners for vices,
defects, or ruin on their property that cause damage to another by enacting
Code article 2317.1, which states:
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage
occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that
he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known
of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the
damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable
care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. 52
To provide another example, before the Act, Louisiana Civil Code
article 2322 stated, “The owner of a building is answerable for the damage
occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when
it is the result of a vice in its original construction.”53 In 1996, the Act
amended article 2322, which now states:
The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned
by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it
is the result of a vice or defect in its original construction.
However, he is answerable for damages only upon a showing that
he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known
The theory is that the owner-guardian is regarded as the risk-creator
because of his relationship with the thing which presents the risk. As
between him and the faultless victim injured as a result of the risk, the
owner-guardian theoretically should bear the loss, because he was in the
best position to discover the risk and to prevent the injury.
Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 497 n.5 (La. 1982).
50. See generally Maraist & Galligan, supra note 10, at 345; see Piacun,
supra note 37.
51. See Piacun, supra note 37, at 230.
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317.1 (2021).
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2322 (1995).
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of the vice or defect which caused the damage, that the damage
could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and
that he failed to exercise such reasonable care.54
Louisiana courts have adhered to the Act since its passage, holding
property owners to negligence standards rather than strict-liability
standards in personal injury lawsuits arising out of ruin, vices, defects, or
other conditions on their property. 55 For example, in Myers v. Dronet, the
plaintiff brought a negligence action against a property owner to recover
damages after she was injured using a defective power tool while
performing yard work on the owner’s property. 56 In determining the
appropriate standard of fault, the court noted the changes brought about by
the Act. 57 The Myers court stated that “article 2317.1 changed the
Loescher strict liability [standard] by infusing ‘actual or constructive
knowledge’ . . . into article 2317, [t]herefore, in effect, the 1996
amendments overruled Loescher and its progeny, replacing its strict
liability concept with a negligence-based rule.” 58 The Myers court went on
to apply a traditional duty-breach negligence analysis, concluding that the
defendant-landowner did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff. 59
D. Slip-and-Fall Law
Within the realm of premises liability is “slip-and-fall” tort litigation,
in which a patron who slips, falls, and is injured as a result of a dangerous
condition or hazard on a business’s premises alleges that the business is at
fault for his or her injury. 60 Generally, a business owes a duty of reasonable
care to protect customers from hazards or dangerous conditions on its
premises. 61 The duty can encompass protection from hazards caused by

54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2322 (2021).
55. Myers v. Dronet, 801 So. 2d 1097, 1101 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2001).
Louisiana courts presently disagree as to the applicability of Civil Code articles
2317.1 and 2322 to slip-and-fall cases. See infra note 185. Regardless of their
applicability in slip-and-fall cases, an understanding of the negligence-based
provisions in articles 2371.1 and 2322 is integral to the arguments set forth in the
later sections of this Comment. See infra Section III.A.
56. Myers, 801 So. 2d at 1101.
57. Id. at 1103–08.
58. Id. at 1105.
59. Id. at 1112.
60. 107 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d § 1 (2021).
61. Myers, 801 So. 2d at 1112.
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the business’s own employees as well as those created by patrons. 62 In
slip-and-fall cases, a business’s legal duty to its customers is a factintensive inquiry. 63 Once a slip-and-fall defendant is found to have a duty,
the court must evaluate case-specific factors such as the location of the
spill, patron traffic in the area at the time of the spill, and the adequacy of
the business’s cleanup procedures in order to determine the scope of the
duty and whether or not the business breached its duty to keep the patron
safe from harm. 64 Oftentimes, the origin of an injury-causing hazard on a
business’s premises is unknown. 65 However, courts have often determined
that these hazards are created inadvertently by employees or by third-party
patrons. 66 Accordingly, the evidentiary burden of proof is of great
significance in slip-and-fall litigation because such cases often turn on
circumstantial evidence. 67
E. The Slip-and-Fall Burden of Proof Pre-Kavlich
Historically, Louisiana courts applied negligence analyses to slip-andfall cases. 68 A plaintiff bringing a slip-and-fall suit under Louisiana law
was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she
slipped, fell, and was injured as a result of a dangerous condition on the
premises, and that the business had actual or constructive knowledge of
the hazardous condition and failed to exercise reasonable care to protect
the plaintiff from injury relating to the condition. 69 Courts using this
approach reasoned that business owners are not strict insurers of their
customers’ safety. 70 Rather, businesses should exercise reasonable care in

62. Dever v. George Theriot’s, Inc., 159 So. 2d 602, 604 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 1964).
63. Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So. 2d 958, 962 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
64. Id.
65. See generally id.; McCardie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 511 So. 2d 1134
(La. 1987).
66. See generally Holden, 690 So. 2d at 962; McCardie, 511 So. 2d 1134.
67. Holden, 690 So. 2d at 962.
68. E.g., Welch v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 655 So. 2d 309, 314 (La. 1995).
69. E.g., Broussard v. Nat’l Food Stores of La., Inc., 233 So. 2d 599, 601 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
70. See generally Levine v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 149 So. 2d 433,
434 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Wisckol v. Ct. Fire Ins. Co., 145 So. 2d 89 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Meyerer v. S.H. Kress & Co., 89 So. 2d 475, 479 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1956); Boucher v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc., 30 So. 2d
211, 214 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1947).
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safeguarding their premises to protect patrons from injuries. 71 Businesses
are then only liable for injuries to a patron if the patron can prove that the
business had a duty to protect the patron from harm and breached that duty
by failing to adequately maintain its premises. 72
F. The Louisiana Supreme Court Addresses the Slip-and-Fall Burden of
Proof: The Kavlich Line of Cases
Negligence-based fault governed slip-and-fall cases until the
Louisiana Supreme Court first addressed the issue in the 1975 case of
Kavlich v. Kramer. 73 In Kavlich, the plaintiff filed suit against a
neighborhood grocery store after slipping on a piece of banana just after
she entered the store. 74 The plaintiff severely injured her left knee and
sought to recover damages against the grocery store. 75 The Kavlich Court
noted that grocery store patrons injured as a result of hazards on the
premises are often in no position to prove who caused the hazard or how
long the hazard existed prior to the fall. 76 Inherent in the Court’s reasoning
was the policy consideration that grocery stores should be held to a
standard of care higher than that of the average business with regard to
slip-and-fall cases. 77 The Kavlich Court considered the fact that grocery
stores, in the interest of increasing sales, exacerbate slip-and-fall risks for
customers by drawing patrons’ attention to the shelves and away from their
walking path. 78 Thus, the Court reasoned, slip-and-fall plaintiffs should
not be held responsible for proving that a defendant grocery store knew or

71. See Levine, 149 So. 2d at 434; Benton v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 145 So. 2d
89 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Meyerer, 89 So. 2d at 479; Boucher, 30 So. 2d at
214.
72. Boucher, 30 So. 2d at 214.
73. Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So. 2d 282 (La. 1975). In fact, the Court decided
Kavlich months before it decided the renowned Loescher case. Unlike Loescher,
the Kavlich opinion does not examine the nature of liability under the premisesliability provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code. However, Kavlich foreshadows
the Court’s plaintiff-friendly interpretation of the Code’s custodial-liability
articles. See Kavlich, 315 So. 2d 282; Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 441 (La.
1975).
74. Kavlich, 315 So. 2d at 284.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 285.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 284.
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should have known of a dangerous condition on its premises. 79 Rather,
grocery stores should carry the burden of disproving negligence. 80
Consequently, the Kavlich Court set out a new standard for slip-andfalls in grocery stores. 81 Under the new Kavlich analysis, a plaintiff
bringing a slip-and-fall suit against a grocery store carried the burden of
proving that he or she slipped, fell, and was injured as a result of a
dangerous condition on the defendant’s premises. 82 Once the plaintiff met
this burden, the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to rebut the
presumption that it breached its duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff.83
A defendant could exculpate itself from the negligence presumption by
introducing evidence to show that it or its employees were “reasonably
prudent in their exercise of duty and care owed to a customer . . . ,”
including evidence or testimony of adequate custodial procedures and the
business’s adherence thereto. 84
In the years following Kavlich, the Louisiana Supreme Court took on
three more slip-and-fall cases, all involving grocery-store defendants. 85
Through this line of cases, the Court intensified the new evidentiary
burden it created in Kavlich. 86 For example, in Gonzales v. Winn-Dixie
Louisiana, Inc., the plaintiff sued a Winn-Dixie grocery store after slipping
and falling on olive oil in a store aisle. 87 The Gonzales Court followed the
Kavlich standard, holding that the plaintiff met her burden of proof by
showing that there was a spill of olive oil on the store’s floor, that she
slipped and fell in the olive oil, and that she sustained injuries as a result. 88
The Gonzales Court then shifted the burden of proof to Winn-Dixie, which
offered evidence of its standard cleanup protocol in an attempt to rebut the
79. Id. at 285.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. In shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, the Kavlich Court
effectuated its policy consideration that “the person to whom society allots the
supervision, care, or guardianship (custody) of the risk-creating person or thing
bears the loss resulting from the creation of the risk, rather than some innocent
third person harmed as a consequence of his failure to prevent the risk.” Loescher
v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 446 (La. 1975).
84. Kavlich, 315 So. 2d at 285.
85. See Gonzales v. Winn-Dixie La., 326 So. 2d 486 (La. 1976); Brown v.
Winn-Dixie La. Inc., 452 So. 2d 685 (La. 1984); McCardie v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 511 So. 2d 1134 (La. 1987).
86. See Gonzales, 326 So. 2d 486; Brown, 452 So. 2d 685; McCardie, 511
So. 2d 1134.
87. Gonzales, 326 So. 2d at 487.
88. Id. at 488.
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presumption of negligence. 89 The Gonzales Court ultimately found WinnDixie at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, specifically noting that WinnDixie failed to provide evidence that its employees followed the protocol
or that its employees did not cause the spill. 90 Thus, the store had not
overcome the presumption of negligence. 91
Eight years later, in Brown v. Winn Dixie Louisiana, Inc., another
Winn-Dixie shopper sought damages from Winn-Dixie after she slipped
on rice, fell, and was injured in the store.92 The Brown Court found the
defendant at fault, applying the Kavlich burden-shifting approach and
adding new, specific evidentiary requirements for the defendant to rebut
the presumption of negligence. 93 Specifically, the Brown Court held that a
grocery store defendant could only exculpate itself from the presumption
of negligence upon proving both that “[its] employees did not cause the
hazard and that [the store] exercised such a degree of care that [it] would
have known under most circumstances of a hazard caused by
customers.” 94
Finally, in the 1987 case of McCardie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a WalMart shopper slipped on a liquid substance on the floor, fell, and was
injured. 95 The McCardie Court cited to Brown for the proposition that—
in order for a grocery store defendant to exculpate itself from the
presumption of negligence—the grocery-store defendant must prove both
that the store’s employees did not cause the hazard 96 and that they
exercised a degree of care sufficient to detect a customer-created hazard
under most circumstances. 97 The Court held that Wal-Mart failed to
exculpate itself from the presumption of negligence because it “failed to
prove that none of its employees caused the spill.” 98
89. Id.
90. Id. at 489.
91. Id.
92. Brown v. Winn-Dixie La. Inc., 452 So. 2d 685, 686 (La. 1984).
93. Id. at 687.
94. Id.
95. McCardie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 511 So. 2d 1134 (La. 1987).
96. Id. at 1135-36 (Cole, J., dissenting). The burden of proving a negative—
that the store’s employees did not cause the hazard—was notably onerous for
grocery-store defendants because it required such defendants to produce
testimony from all on-duty employees that could have encountered the hazard
about their awareness thereof. Id.
97. Id. at 1135.
98. Id. at 1136. McCardie was a 4-3 decision. In dissent, Justices Cole and
Marcus argued that the Court’s requirement that grocery store defendants prove
that none of their employees caused the spill was too stringent. Both expressed
concern that the evidentiary burden imposed on the defendant grocery stores had
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In Kavlich, the Louisiana Supreme Court established a new plaintifffriendly standard for slip-and-fall cases involving grocery-store
defendants. 99 The Court further escalated its burden-shifting approach
through Brown and McCardie, where it restricted the means by which a
slip-and-fall defendant could rebut the negligence presumption. 100 After
McCardie, a grocery store defendant could not avoid liability unless it
proved both that (1) none of its employees caused the hazard and (2) it
exercised such a degree of care that it would have detected a customercreated hazard under most circumstances.101 The McCardie standard,
fueled by the policy considerations on which it was created, was a drastic
deviation from the traditional negligence burdens of proof applied in the
pre-Kavlich era. 102 The elevated standard was notably onerous for grocerystore defendants seeking to avoid liability for patrons’ slip-and-fall
injuries. 103 Ergo, the legislators sought reform.
G. Legislative Slip-and-Fall Reform: Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:2800.6
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s adoption of the burden-shifting
standard for slip-and-fall liability gave rise to widespread concern and
frustration among Louisiana’s retailers and restaurants. 104 These brickand-mortar establishments were upset by the legal implications of the
unprecedented, plaintiff-friendly standard set by Kavlich and its

expanded too far beyond Kavlich. They agreed that a defendant should be able to
exculpate itself from the negligence presumption by showing adequate cleanup
procedures. Justice Cole warned that the Court’s new standard “might well
suggest the imposition of an impracticable and almost insurmountable burden of
proof every time someone is unfortunate enough to fall in these large market
places.” Id.
99. See generally Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So. 2d 282 (La. 1975).
100. See Brown, 452 So. 2d at 687; McCardie, 511 So. 2d at 1135.
101. McCardie, 511 So. 2d at 1135.
102. Id.
103. Minutes of Meeting, Senate Comm. on Judiciary A, at 3 (June 14, 1988)
(on file with Louisiana Senate Docket). The Brown and McCardie standard was
controversial because it required grocery-store defendants to prove that none of
their employees caused the spill. This required grocery-store defendants to call
each of their employees as witnesses to testify as to whether they caused the spill.
Id.
104. See generally Minutes of Meeting, Civ. L. & Proc. Comm. 10–11 (June
17, 1988) (on file with Louisiana Senate Docket) [hereinafter 1988 Minutes, Civ.
L. & Proc.]
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progeny. 105 Specifically, Louisiana businesses opposed the stringent
evidentiary burden created by Brown in 1984 and McCardie in 1987. 106
As a result, industry representatives backed Senate Bill 452 of Louisiana’s
1988 Regular Session—a proposal intended to abolish the two-fold
evidentiary hurdle for slip-and-fall defendants. 107 Upon passage, the bill
was promulgated as Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.6, commonly
known as “the Merchant Liability Statute.” 108 The 1988 Merchant
Liability Statute effectively codified the Kavlich burden-shifting approach
for slip-and-fall cases against “merchants,” stating:
In a suit for damages by a person who has suffered damages as the
result of a hazardous condition while on the merchant’s premises,
the person must prove that the accident was caused by a hazardous
105. Id.
106. Id; see Brown v. Winn-Dixie La. Inc., 452 So. 2d 685, 687 (La. 1984);
McCardie, 511 So. 2d at 1135.
107. S. 452, 1988 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1988). Upon passage, the language of
the statute provided:
A. A merchant owes a duty to persons who use his premises to exercise
reasonable care to keep his aisles, passageways, and floors in a
reasonably safe condition. This duty includes a reasonable effort to keep
the premises free of any hazardous conditions which reasonably might
give rise to damage.
B. In a suit for damages by a person who has suffered damages as the
result of a hazardous condition while on the merchant's premises, the
person must prove that the accident was caused by a hazardous
condition. The burden of proof then shifts to the merchant to prove that
he acted in a reasonably prudent manner in exercising the duty of care
he owed to the person to keep the premises free of any hazardous
conditions.
C. In exculpating himself from liability under this Subsection, the
merchant need not introduce the testimony of every employee of the
merchant or any particular proportion thereof, but is only required to
introduce the testimony of any employee shown to have actually created
the hazardous condition and those employees and management
personnel whose job responsibilities included inspection or cleanup of
the area where the accident giving rise to the damages occurred.
D. “Merchant” means one whose business is to sell goods, foods, wares,
or merchandise at a fixed place of business.
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (1988). In the words of Senator Robert T. Garrity,
presenting the bill to the Senate Civil Law and Procedure Committee, “This bill
is aimed at McCardie v. Wal-Mart.” 1988 Minutes, Civ. L. & Proc., supra note
104, at 10–11.
108. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6(B) (1988).
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condition. The burden of proof then shifts to the merchant to prove
that he acted in a reasonably prudent manner in exercising the duty
of care he owed to the person to keep the premises free of any
hazardous conditions. 109
In accordance with the lobbyists’ concerns, the 1988 Merchant
Liability Statute also explicitly abolished the elevated evidentiary hurdles
for defendants set forth in McCardie, providing:
In exculpating himself from liability under this Subsection, the
merchant need not introduce the testimony of every employee of
the merchant or any particular proportion thereof, but is only
required to introduce the testimony of any employee shown to
have actually created the hazardous condition and those
employees and management personnel whose job responsibilities
included inspection or cleanup of the area where the accident
giving rise to the damages occurred. 110
The standard set by the 1988 Merchant Liability Statute was
defendant-friendly in comparison to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
McCardie standard. 111 However, Louisiana merchants were still frustrated
with the burden-shifting standard to which they were held in slip-and-fall
cases. 112 In 1990, only two years after the enactment of the original
Merchant Liability Statute, Louisiana merchants backed Senate Bill 478
of the 1990 Louisiana Regular Session. 113 The bill proposed an
amendment that repealed the burden-shifting standard set forth in the
original Merchant Liability Statute in favor of a traditional negligence
standard. 114 During committee deliberations regarding the bill, legislators
109. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6(B) (1998).
110. Id. § 9:2800.6(C).
111. Id.; McCardie, 511 So. 2d 1134.
112. See generally Minutes of Meeting, Senate Comm. on Judiciary A, at 11–
12 (June 5, 1990) (on file with Louisiana Senate Docket) [hereinafter 1990
Minutes, Judiciary A].
113. S. 478, 1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1990).
114. Id. Upon passage, the language of the statute provided:
(A) A merchant owes a duty to persons who use his premises to exercise
reasonable care to keep his aisles, passageways, and floors in a
reasonably safe condition. This duty includes a reasonable effort to keep
the premises free of any hazardous conditions which reasonably might
give rise to damage.
(B) In a negligence claim brought against a merchant by a person
lawfully on the merchant's premises for damages as a result of an injury,
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and parties representing Louisiana’s merchant community pointed out
multiple shortcomings created by the 1988 Merchant Liability Statute and
its burden-shifting approach. 115
For example, in advocating for the amendment, Senator Larry
Bankston argued that the elevated burden of proof that the 1988 Merchant
Liability Statute imposed on merchant-defendants increased legal
expenses for merchants, which ultimately resulted in higher prices for
shoppers. 116 Representatives from the Louisiana Retailers Association
addressed the Senate Committee on Judiciary A to express their disdain
for the new evidentiary burden, arguing that the 1988 Merchant Liability
Statute unfairly discriminated against merchants. 117 The industry
representatives argued that the burden-shifting standard of fault subjected
merchant-retailers to excessive litigation and frivolous slip-and-fall claims
from patrons who sought to take advantage of the plaintiff-friendly
standard of fault. 118 Further, in the House Committee of Civil Law and
Procedure, Representative James Donelson noted that the burden-shifting

death, or loss sustained because of a fall due to a condition existing in or
on a merchant's premises, the claimant shall have the burden of proving,
in addition to all other elements of his cause of action, all of the
following: (1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to
the claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable; and (2)
The merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the
condition which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence; and (3) The
merchant failed to exercise reasonable care.
(C) Definitions: (1) “Constructive notice” means . . . the condition
existed for such a period of time that it would have been discovered if
the merchant had exercised reasonable care. (2) “Merchant” means one
whose business is to sell goods, foods, wares, or merchandise at a fixed
place of business.
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (1990).
115. See generally 1990 Minutes, Judiciary A, supra note 112, at 11–12. The
bill was supported by Louisiana retailers, grocery stores, and other businesses that
were adversely affected by the burden of proof implemented by the 1988
Merchant Liability Statute. Id.
116. Id. The original version of Senate Bill 478 stated, “Claims against
merchants for premise liability [to] increase, the cost of which is borne by
consumers. Therefore, the legislature’s intention is to remedy this inequitable
situation.” Id.
117. 1990 Minutes, Judiciary A, supra note 112, at 11–12 (statements by Nick
Perez & James Fernandez).
118. Id.
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approach skewed the value of plaintiffs’ claims, making slip-and-fall
claims more difficult to settle. 119
In response to the lobbyists’ efforts, the Louisiana Legislature passed
Senate Bill 478, amending the 1988 Merchant Liability Statute and
reinstating the traditional requirement that a plaintiff seeking damages
against a merchant for a slip-and-fall claim prove that the defendant had
actual or constructive notice of the condition. 120 Specifically, the 1990
amendment added a negligence burden of proof into the statute, stating:
[i]n a negligence claim brought against a merchant . . . for
damages as a result of an injury, death, or loss sustained because
of a fall due to a condition existing in or on a merchant’s premises,
the claimant shall have the burden of proving, and in addition to
all other elements of his cause of action, all of the following:
(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the
claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable; and
(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive
notice of the condition which caused the damage, prior to the
occurrence; and
(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care.121
The Louisiana Supreme Court first recognized the new slip-and-fall
standard in the 1995 case of Welch v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. 122 Citing
the 1990 Merchant Liability Statute, the Welch Court recognized that the
legislature abrogated the burden-shifting approach it had previously
developed, and applied the negligence standard set out by the 1990
Merchant Liability Statute. 123 Specifically, the Welch Court noted, “In
1990, the Legislature changed direction completely and enacted the
current version of the [Merchant Liability] statute which, according to one
commentator, codifies the ‘traditional’ rule of liability requiring actual or
constructive knowledge and places the burden of proof squarely on the
plaintiff.” 124 The 1990 Merchant Liability Statute, with its traditional
119. Minutes of Meeting, Civ. L. & Proc. Comm. 11 (June 12, 1990) (on file
with Louisiana Senate Docket) (statements by S. Donelson).
120. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (1990).
121. Id.
122. Welch v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 655 So. 2d 309 (La. 1995).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 314. The Welch Court followed the new statutory slip-and-fall
standard but ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiff despite the fact that the
plaintiff introduced no evidence suggesting the amount of time the hazard existed
before she slipped and fell. Id. Two years later, in White v. Wal-Mart Stores, the
Louisiana Supreme Court overruled Welch, noting that:
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negligence approach, still operates as the exclusive standard for slip-andfall suits against merchants today. 125
In sum, the Louisiana Legislature, backed by representatives of the
Louisiana merchant community, reformed the plaintiff-friendly burdenshifting standard developed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Kavlich,
Brown, and McCardie. The 1988 Merchant Liability Statute did away with
the two-fold evidentiary burden from Brown and McCardie, and the 1990
amendments eliminated the burden-shifting standard altogether—
effectively restoring the negligence-based burden from the pre-Kavlich
era.
II. LOUISIANA’S JURISPRUDENTIAL INCONSISTENCY REGARDING THE
BURDEN OF PROOF IN SLIP-AND-FALL CASES AGAINST MEDICAL
INSTITUTIONS
The evolution of Louisiana’s premises-liability- and slip-and-fallspecific standards occurred through distinct lines of jurisprudence and
statutory refinements. However, they were analogous in that they occurred
[b]ecause La. R.S. 9:2800.6(B) clearly and unambiguously requires the
claimant to prove each of its three subsections with no shifting of the
burden, and because in order to prove constructive notice the statute
clearly and unambiguously requires that the claimant prove that the
damage causing condition existed for some period of time prior to the
occurrence, we overrule Welch, 655 So. 2d 309, which allowed for a
finding of constructive notice absent a showing that the condition existed
for some period of time prior to the occurrence and which provided for
a shifting of the burden to the defendant merchant to prove it exercised
reasonable care.
White v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 699 So. 2d 1081, 1085 (La. 1997).
125. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (2021). The Merchant Liability Statute was
amended to its present form in 1996. The 1996 amendment added three material
changes. First, the 1996 version added to paragraph (B)(3) and clarified that “[i]n
determining reasonable care, the absence of a written or verbal uniform cleanup
or safety procedure is insufficient, alone, to prove failure to exercise reasonable
care.” Second, the amendment expanded the definition of constructive notice in
section paragraph (C)(1), clarifying that “[t]he presence of an employee of the
merchant in the vicinity in which the condition exists does not, alone, constitute
constructive notice, unless it is shown that the employee knew, or in the exercise
of reasonable care should have known, of the condition.” Finally, the amendment
added to the definition of merchant in section (C)(2), stating, “For purposes of
this Section, a merchant includes an innkeeper with respect to those areas or
aspects of the premises which are similar to those of a merchant, including but not
limited to shops, restaurants, and lobby areas of or within the hotel, motel, or inn.”
Id.
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during the same time period and reflected the changing judicial and
legislative stances on premises-liability standards of fault at the time they
occurred. Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317.1 and 2322 apply generally
to all premises, so the negligence-based premises-liability principles
implemented by the Act were all encompassing.126 Contrarily, slip-andfall tort reform was not as comprehensive. The Merchant Liability Statute
only clarified the burden of proof applicable to slip-and-fall suits brought
against merchants, presumably because Louisiana’s merchant community
vehemently advocated for statutory protection from the Kavlich burdenshifting approach. 127 As a result, the burden of proof for slip-and-fall cases
against non-merchants remains unaddressed by both the Louisiana
Supreme Court and the Louisiana Legislature. 128 Absent statutory
guidance, Louisiana courts rely on caselaw to set the standard of fault for
slip-and-fall cases against medical institutions—resulting in disagreement
among Louisiana’s appellate courts over the proper standard applicable to
such cases. 129
A. Louisiana’s Appellate Courts Apply Inconsistent Standards of Fault to
Slip-and-Fall Suits Brought Against Medical Institutions
Louisiana’s appellate courts inconsistently adjudicate slip-and-fall
suits against medical-institution defendants, considering different
jurisprudential standards and statutes to set the standard of fault. 130 The
jurisprudential dispute over the applicable standard can be divided into
two different approaches, both of which have roots in the aforementioned
history of custodial- liability and slip-and-fall jurisprudence in Louisiana.
Some appellate courts adhere to the burden-shifting standard first set out
in the Kavlich line of cases, in which an injured plaintiff satisfies his
126. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317.1, 2322 (2021).
127. See supra Section I.G. The Merchant Liability Statute defines merchant
as:
one whose business is to sell goods, foods, wares, or merchandise at a
fixed place of business. For purposes of this Section, a merchant includes
an innkeeper with respect to those areas or aspects of the premises which
are similar to those of a merchant, including but not limited to shops,
restaurants, and lobby areas of or within the hotel, motel, or inn.
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (2021).
128. Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So. 2d 958, 963–94
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
129. Connelly v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 648, 659 (E.D. La.
2014).
130. Id.
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evidentiary burden by showing that he fell and was injured as a result of a
dangerous or hazardous condition on the medical institution’s premises. 131
The burden then shifts to the defendant medical institution to exculpate
itself from a presumption of negligence. 132 The burden-shifting approach
has been used by each of Louisiana’s appellate courts in evaluating slipand-fall negligence claims against medical-institution defendants;
however, it is used most consistently in the Third and Fifth circuits. 133
None of the appellate courts have exclusively adopted the burden-shifting
approach. 134
Other appellate courts have abided by a seemingly defendant-friendly
standard that reflects the burden of proof in traditional negligence cases,
as illustrated in Holden v. Louisiana State Medical Center in
Shreveport. 135 This approach requires the plaintiff to prove not only that
he or she slipped, fell, and was injured as a result of a foreign substance
on a medical institution’s premises, but also that the defendant either
caused the hazardous condition or breached its duty by failing to
adequately inspect its premises for hazards. 136 In applying the Holden
standard or one similar, both the First and Second circuits have expressly
rejected the popular burden-shifting approach. 137 Proponents of the
131. Connelly, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 656.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Terrance v. Baton Rouge Gen. Med. Ctr., 39 So. 3d 842, 844
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010); Harkins v. Natchitoches Par. Hosp., 696 So. 2d 19,
21 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997); Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 639 So. 2d 1214, 1216
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 563 So. 2d
312, 315 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir 1990).
134. See, e.g., Terrance, 39 So. 3d at 844; Harkins, 696 So. 2d at 21; Neyrey,
639 So. 2d at 1216; LeBlanc, 563 So. 2d at 315. For example, in the 2015 case of
Smith v. Northshore Regional Medical Center, the First Circuit stated, “As the
plaintiff in this slip-and-fall case, [the plaintiff] must show that she slipped, fell,
and was injured because of a foreign substance on the hospital’s premises. The
burden then shifts to the hospital to exculpate itself from the presumption of
negligence.” Smith v. Northshore Reg’l Med. Ctr., 170 So. 3d 173, 176 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2015). Yet five years later, the same court applied a negligencebased burden of proof in a separate hospital slip-and-fall case. Rixner v. Our Lady
of Lake Hosp., Inc., 306 So. 3d 444, 449 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2020).
135. Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So. 2d 958, 964 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997). In Holden, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court’s
application of the burden-shifting approach in favor of a negligence-based
approach. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. The First Circuit has applied both standards mentioned above
inconsistently. For example, the court applied the burden-shifting approach in
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negligence-based standard take the position that the policy-driven burdenshifting standard was created exclusively for grocery stores or merchanttype businesses, and that the traditional negligence burden should never
have been removed from slip-and-fall cases involving hazardous
conditions on the premises of non-merchant defendants, including medical
institutions. 138
B. Inequities Created by the Judicial Inconsistency
The uncertainty in Louisiana as to the proper burden of proof in slipand-fall cases against medical institutions gives rise to at least three issues.
First, parties to slip-and-fall cases are often uncertain as to the applicable
burden of proof. 139 For example, in Connelly v. Veterans Administration
Hospital, the plaintiff acknowledged that she “[was] in a quandary as to
how to carry her burden of proof.” 140 In Bell v. Carencro Nursing Home,
Inc., plaintiff’s counsel argued to the trial court that the defendant was
required to show evidence that the facility implemented and practiced
proper custodial procedures. 141 The judge then responded, “Ma’am, that’s
your burden.” 142 To promote efficiency, it is in the best interest of the
Louisiana court system to make litigants aware of the evidentiary and
procedural standards to which they will be held.
Second, the differing evidentiary burdens can provide for inconsistent
adjudications of otherwise indistinguishable slip-and-fall claims. 143 For
example, in the Second Circuit’s Holden case, both the plaintiff and the
defendant, LSU Medical Center, rested their cases without introducing any
evidence as to LSU Medical Center’s custodial procedures for the area
where the plaintiff fell. 144 The Holden court applied a negligence-based
approach and ruled in favor of LSU Medical Center, noting that the
plaintiff had not alleged facts sufficient to prove that LSU Medical Center
Toussaint v. Baton Rouge General Medical Center and applied a negligence
standard in Rixner v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital. See Toussaint v. Baton
Rouge Med. Ctr., 251 So. 3d 1151 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018); Rixner, 306 So.
3d 444.
138. Holden, 690 So. 2d at 964.
139. See, e.g., Connelly v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 648, 657
(E.D. La. 2014).
140. Id. at 659.
141. Bell v. Carencro Nursing Home, Inc., 202 So. 3d 499, 503 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 2016).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Holden, 690 So. 2d at 963.
144. Id. at 961.

1300

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

breached its duty of care. 145 However, had a different court decided the
Holden case and applied the burden-shifting approach, LSU Medical
Center likely would not have had sufficient evidence to rebut the
negligence presumption and the plaintiff would have prevailed. 146
Further, in the case of Mosely v. Methodist Health System Foundation,
Inc., a plaintiff brought a slip-and-fall negligence suit against Pendleton
Memorial Hospital in New Orleans after slipping in a puddle on the floor
of a hospital room, falling, and injuring herself. 147 The plaintiff and her
grandmother testified that they saw a small tube disconnected from the
patient’s catheter leaking urine onto the floor. 148 The patient’s nurse
testified for Pendleton, stating that she emptied the urine bag less than an
hour before the accident and saw no liquid on the floor at the time. 149
However, she did notice liquid on the floor upon responding to the
accident. 150 The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant hospital for two
reasons. 151 The plaintiff failed to prove that the condition on the premises
posed an unreasonable risk of harm and also failed to prove that the
hospital either created the condition or had actual or constructive
knowledge of the condition. 152 However, on appeal, the Fourth Circuit
rejected the trial court’s application of the negligence-based burden of
proof and applied the burden-shifting approach, citing to a prior case in
which the Fourth Circuit deemed the burden-shifting approach the proper
standard for slip-and-fall claims against hospitals. 153 The Mosely court
reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of the plaintiff, stating, “Applied
to this case the proper burden of proof renders a different outcome.” 154
Finally, the burden-shifting standard of fault causes unwarranted
financial and legal problems for medical institutions. Legislative
committee meeting notes from the bill that later became the 1990
amendment to the Merchant Liability Statute show that representatives
from Louisiana’s merchant community presented statistics showing that
Louisiana merchants subjected to the elevated evidentiary burden incurred

145. Id. at 964.
146. Id.
147. Mosely v. Methodist Health Sys. Found., Inc., 776 So. 2d 21, 22 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2000).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 23.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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expenses higher than merchants in surrounding states. 155 Part of the
rationale behind the 1990 amendment to the statute was that the resulting
increased expenses for merchants were being passed onto the merchant’s
customers. 156 The lobbyists also argued that cases in which the plaintiff
does not need to prove actual or constructive knowledge on part of the
defendant have skewed settlement values because plaintiffs were much
more likely to prevail on their personal injury claims. 157
Similarly, Louisiana medical institutions that are unfairly subjected to
the burden-shifting approach likely face higher legal and financial costs as
a result of the elevated standards of fault they face in court. For example,
the medical institution defendant in Mosely would have escaped liability
for the plaintiff’s injuries had the Fourth Circuit not changed the applicable
standard of fault. 158 Further, as indicated by the lobbyists who argued for
the 1990 amendment to the Merchant Liability Statute, diminished legal
burdens for plaintiffs implicitly promote frivolous litigation, decrease the
settlement likelihood, and skew the value of slip-and-fall personal injury
claims. 159 Without legislative or judicial policy justifications, medical
institutions do not deserve the onerous legal burdens that result from the
burden-shifting standard of fault.
The Louisiana Legislature enacted extensive codal and statutory
premises-liability-reforming legislation in the 1990s to resolve all of the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s controversial changes to premises-liability
burdens of proof. However, this tort reform left behind a gap through
which the controversy over the burden-shifting standard persists in cases
against medical institutions. In order to best effectuate its previous tortreform legislation, the legislature should amend Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2800 to clarify the standard of fault for slip-and-fall cases
brought against medical institution defendants. Express statutory guidance
would clarify the uncertainty among litigants, ensure consistent
application of Louisiana premises-liability law, and mitigate the legal and
financial burdens for medical institution defendants.

155. 1990 Minutes, Judiciary A, supra note 112, at 11–12 (statements by Nick
Perez & James Fernandez).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Mosely, 776 So. 2d at 23.
159. 1990 Minutes, Judiciary A, supra note 112, at 11–12 (statements by Nick
Perez & James Fernandez).
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III. STUCK IN THE PAST: EXAMINING THE IMPROPRIETIES OF THE
BURDEN-SHIFTING APPROACH
The burden-shifting standard of fault is an antiquated legal standard
of Louisiana premises-liability law, which the Louisiana Legislature
replaced through the tort reform legislation of the 1990s. 160 The Louisiana
courts that have applied the burden-shifting approach in slip-and-fall cases
against medical institutions have failed to consider the standard’s
contextual impropriety, thus perpetuating a continuing chain of unfounded
caselaw that is unsupported by Louisiana policy. 161 For these reasons, the
burden-shifting approach is improper and actively misrepresents
Louisiana law to the detriment of Louisiana’s medical institutions.
A. The Burden-Shifting Approach is Akin to Strict Liability, Which No
Longer Fits Within Louisiana’s Premises-Liability Scheme
Courts that have favored the burden-shifting approach have often
failed to evaluate the standard’s jurisprudential history. 162 Other courts
have mislabeled the burden-shifting standard as a form of “elevated
standard of care” for medical institutions to which it applies. 163 This
description, however, is inconsistent with Louisiana’s fault scheme under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. 164 In reality, an elevated standard of
care and a presumption of legal duty are separate concepts that implicate
different elements of the negligence analysis. 165 In a negligence action,
plaintiffs carry the burden of proving that the defendant owed them a duty
of care. 166 Once the plaintiff proves the defendant’s duty, courts have
discretion to modify the standard of reasonable care commensurate with

160. See id.
161. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 563 So. 2d 312, 316
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1990); Reynolds v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 597 So. 2d 1121,
1123–24 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 639 So. 2d 1214,
1216 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
162. See, e.g., LeBlanc, 563 So. 2d at 316; Reynolds, 597 So. 2d at 1123–24;
Neyrey, 639 So. 2d at 1216.
163. Rixner v. Our Lady of Lake Hosp., Inc., 306 So. 3d 444, 451 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2020).
164. See Parfait v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 638 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1994); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (1996).
165. Oster v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., State of La., 582 So. 2d 1285 (La.
1991).
166. See id. at 1288.
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the circumstances. 167 Conversely, the burden-shifting approach relieves
the plaintiff of proving the defendant’s duty, so long as the plaintiff proves
that his or her injury was caused by a dangerous condition on the
defendant’s premises. 168
According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, “the only difference
between the negligence theory of recovery and the strict liability theory of
recovery is that the plaintiff need not prove the defendant was aware of the
existence of the ‘defect’ under a strict liability theory.” 169 Thus, the
burden-shifting approach is not a derivation of negligence-based fault. 170
In fact, the “presumption of negligence” is not indicative of a negligence
analysis at all; instead, it is congruent to fault based on Louisiana’s version
of strict premises liability, as first implemented by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in the 1970s. 171
Yet Louisiana courts that apply the burden-shifting approach do not
refer to it as a standard of or similar to strict liability. 172 These courts often
cite to precedent in implementing the burden-shifting approach without
analyzing the nature of the standard. 173 However, courts that have opposed
the use of the burden-shifting approach in slip-and-fall cases against
medical institutions have raised concerns about the standard’s strictliability nature.174 For example, the Holden court rejected the trial court’s
application of the burden-shifting standard and instead required that the
plaintiff present evidence to prove LSU Medical Center’s duty and
breach. 175 The Holden court ruled in favor of the hospital, stating, “Since
fault cannot be based upon strict liability, defendant’s fault for a negligent

167. FRANK L. MARAIST, JOHN M. CHURCH, WILLIAM R. CORBETT, ET AL.,
TORT LAW – THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 145 (3rd ed. 2017).
168. See generally Oster, 582 So. 2d 1285; Terrance v. Baton Rouge Gen.
Med. Ctr., 39 So. 3d 842, 844 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010).
169. Oster, 582 So. 2d at 1288.
170. Id.
171. Rixner v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 306 So. 3d 444, 451 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2020).
172. See, e.g., Terrance, 39 So. 3d at 844; Harkins v. Natchitoches Par. Hosp.,
696 So. 2d 19, 21 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997); Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 639
So. 2d 1214, 1216 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Alton Ochsner Med.
Found., 563 So. 2d 312, 316 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
173. See, e.g., Terrance, 39 So. 3d at 844; Harkins, 696 So. 2d at 21; Neyrey,
639 So. 2d at 1216; LeBlanc, 563 So. 2d at 316.
174. See, e.g., Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So. 2d 958,
964 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Rixner, 306 So. 3d at 450–51; Connelly v.
Veterans Admin. Hosp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 648, 659 (E.D. La. 2014).
175. Holden, 690 So. 2d at 964.
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breach of duty was not demonstrated in this instance by some evidence of
the defendant’s lack of reasonable inspection.” 176
Further, in Connelly v. Veterans Administration Hospital, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana applied Louisiana slipand-fall law to the plaintiff’s suit brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 177 The Connelly court noted the disagreement among Louisiana
appellate courts as to the proper standard of fault applicable in slip-andfall cases against medical institutions and evaluated both the burdenshifting approach and Holden’s negligence-based approach. 178 The
Connelly court ultimately applied a traditional negligence standard, noting
that “[e]liminating the actual or constructive knowledge requirement
‘would be to impose strict liability on the defendant.’” 179 Finally, in
Rixner v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, the Louisiana First Circuit
discussed the impropriety of the burden-shifting approach as applied to
slip-and-fall cases against medical institutions. 180 Notably, Judge
McDonald’s “agreeing” opinion pointed out that “the use of [the burdenshifting] approach is inconsistent with the purpose of the merchant liability
statute, and it places an extremely high standard on hospitals, akin to strict
liability, which was never contemplated by either the Supreme Court or
the legislature.” 181 Given the fundamental characteristics of the burdenshifting standard, Holden, Connelly, and Rixner are correct—the burdenshifting standard is analogous to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s strictliability standard.182
Accordingly, Louisiana courts’ continuous application of the burdenshifting standard is inappropriate because Louisiana statutes and
jurisprudence no longer support strict premises liability as they did during
the Loescher and Kavlich eras. 183 For instance, Louisiana statutory law
176. Id.
177. Connelly, 23 F. Supp. 3d 648.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 659 (citing Wiggins v. United States, 2009 WL 2176043, at *6 (E.D.
La. July 22, 2009)).
180. Rixner v. Our Lady of Lake Hosp., Inc., 306 So. 3d 444, 451 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2020) (McDonald, J., agreeing).
181. Id. In Rixner, Judge McDonald “agree[d] and assign[ed] additional
reasons,” explaining the history of Louisiana slip-and-fall law and the present-day
impropriety of the burden-shifting approach as applied to slip-and-fall cases
against medical institutions. Id. at 450.
182. Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So. 2d 958, 964 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Connelly, 23 F. Supp. 3d 648; Rixner, 306 So. 3d at 449.
183. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 444 (La. 1975); Kavlich v. Kramer, 315
So. 2d 282, 285 (La. 1975).
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provides several causes of action to persons who are injured in a building
or its premises belonging to another. 184 Since its enactment as part of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1996, Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.1 sets
the standard for premises-liability claims resulting from vices or defects
within a premises, such as a loose handrail in a staircase or a defective
sidewalk. 185 Louisiana Civil Code article 2322 applies to premisesliability claims for damages occasioned by the ruin of a building—
specifically when the damages result from the owner’s neglect to repair
the building or a vice or defect in the building’s original construction. 186
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.6, the Merchant Liability Statute, sets
the standard for premises-liability claims arising out of hazardous or
dangerous conditions on or in the premises of a merchant. 187 Finally,
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800(A)–(C) provides conditions for
public-entity liability when damages result from the condition of buildings
within the legal custody of a public entity. 188 Each of these four statutory
provisions has always required, or was amended to require, that the
plaintiff prove the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the
particular risk that caused damage and that the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care to eliminate the risk. 189 Considering the fact that
184. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317.1, 2322 (2021).
185. See Id. art. 2317.1. Louisiana courts presently disagree as to whether
Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.1 applies to hazardous conditions on a
premises, such as a liquid on the floor or an improperly situated floormat. On the
one hand, the Fifth Circuit has applied Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.1 to such
defects in cases such as Blount v. East Jefferson General Hospital and Becker v.
Jefferson Parish Hospital District Number Two. On the other hand, the Second
Circuit has held that Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.1 applies only to structural
vices or defects in a premises, as illustrated in Holden v. Louisiana State Medical
Center in Shreveport and Adams v. Louisiana State University Health Sciences
Center Shreveport. See Blount v. E. Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 887 So. 2d 535 (La.
Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2004); Becker v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 154 So. 3d
537 (La. 2014); Adams v. La. State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. Shreveport, 19 So. 3d
512 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2009); Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport,
690 So. 2d 958, 962 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
186. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2322 (2021).
187. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (2021).
188. See id. § 9:2800 (A)–(C). Public entity liability under Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2800 (A)–(C) is based on the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code
article 2317. See generally id.
189. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317.1, 2322 (2021); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 9:2800.6, 9:2800(A)–(C) (2021). Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800(C) has
imposed a negligence-based standard for public entity liability since its
promulgation in 1985, and Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.6 has imposed a
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Louisiana’s current statutory instances of premises-liability unanimously
require negligence-based fault, Louisiana courts’ continued application of
the burden-shifting approach to cases involving medical institutions
plainly contradicts Louisiana law. 190
To illustrate, property owners are likely aware, or at least should be
aware, of the structural condition of their building. Vices or defects within
a premises can result from its old age, deterioration, lack of maintenance,
or physical force caused by weather or accident, and building owners are
responsible for maintaining the physical integrity of their properties.
Conversely, property owners are much less likely to be aware of spills or
hazardous conditions that arise in the everyday course of business because
such hazards cannot always be anticipated and are often spontaneously
caused by third parties. 191 Property owners are arguably less likely to be
aware of spontaneous spills than they are of defects in physical integrity
of their building. It logically follows that the standard of fault for cases
involving extemporaneous spills or hazards on any premises should be
lower than or at least equal to the standard applicable to cases involving
vices, defects, or structural flaws in a building. Both Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2317.1 and 2322 and the Merchant Liability Statute exclusively
mandate negligence standards. 192 A fortiori, slip-and-fall cases against
medical institutions should be adjudged according to negligence
standards.
For example, a hospital visitor who falls through the dilapidated
second-story floor of a hospital would not recover damages from the
hospital under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.1 or 2322 unless the
visitor introduced evidence sufficient to prove that the hospital owner had
actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition of the floor—
the court would not presume the hospital’s knowledge of the structural
condition of the floor. 193 However, under a present judicial interpretation
negligence-based standard since its amendment in 1990. Both articles 2317.1 and
2322 were previously interpreted to allow property owners to be held strictly
liable for injuries caused by defects in their premises. However, both provisions
were amended as part of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1996 to expressly
mandate negligence-based fault standards. See supra Section I.C; LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 9:2800(C), 9:2800.6 (2021).
190. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317.1, 2322 (2021); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 9:2800.6, 9:2800(A)–(C) (2021).
191. See Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So. 2d 958, 962
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
192. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317.1, 2322 (2021); see LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6
(2021).
193. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317.1, 2322 (2021).
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of the law, the same court might presume the hospital’s awareness of a
small spill of apple sauce on the hallway floor that had been caused by a
hospital visitor and apply a much stricter standard of fault. 194 Within the
context of Louisiana’s negligence-based premises-liability standards, the
burden-shifting approach is disproportionately strict on medical institution
defendants, and Louisiana courts’ application of the burden-shifting
approach to slip-and-fall claims against medical institution defendants is a
gross misapplication of Louisiana law. Despite its inapplicability, the
strict-liability burden-shifting standard remains relevant, in large part, as
a result of courts’ repeated reliance on outdated caselaw. 195
B. The Burden-Shifting Approach Is a Product of Improper Reliance on
Outdated Caselaw
As previously stated, the premises-liability reform brought about by
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1996 and the Merchant Liability Statute
did not specifically address the standard of fault applicable to slip-and-fall
cases involving hazardous conditions on the premises of non-merchants,
including medical institutions. 196 Thus, Louisiana courts evaluating slipand-fall cases against non-merchant entities have relied on caselaw to set
the legal standard. 197 Following the premises-liability reform of the 1990s,
Louisiana courts adopted the newly mandated negligence standards as the
prevailing law applicable to premises-liability cases. 198 However, without
statutory guidance regarding the standard applicable to slip-and-fall cases
against non-merchants, Louisiana courts continued to apply the burdenshifting standard only to cases against medical institution defendants,
seemingly without regard for the negligence-based changes to Louisiana
premises-liability law. 199
194. See generally LeBlanc v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 563 So. 2d 312,
316 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1990); Reynolds v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 597 So. 2d
1121, 1123–24 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 639 So.
2d 1214, 1216 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
195. See generally LeBlanc, 563 So. 2d at 316; Reynolds, 597 So. 2d at 1123;
Neyrey, 639 So. 2d at 1216.
196. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317.1 (2021); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (2021).
197. See supra cases cited note 195.
198. See generally Welch v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 655 So. 2d 309, 314 (La.
1995); Maraist & Galligan, supra note 10.
199. See supra cases cited note 195. Medical institutions are the only nonmerchant entities that Louisiana courts routinely subject to the burden-shifting
approach. Conversely, courts apply negligence-based fault standards to slip-andfall cases against other non-merchants such as schools, office buildings, and
prisons. See generally Green v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 780 So. 2d 1082, 1083 (La.
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To illustrate, the Fifth Circuit decided LeBlanc v. Alton Ochsner
Medical Foundation in May 1990. 200 LeBlanc was one of the first cases in
which a Louisiana court applied the burden-shifting standard to a slip-andfall case brought against a medical institution, and courts still frequently
rely on the LeBlanc holding today. 201 In LeBlanc, the plaintiff brought a
slip-and-fall suit against Ochsner Foundation Hospital after slipping on a
piece of cucumber in a hallway corridor and injuring her back and hip. 202
The LeBlanc court found that “Kavlich and its progeny govern to the
extent that they require the premises owner to exculpate itself from the
presumption of negligence.” 203 However, the LeBlanc court failed to
evaluate the applicability of the burden-shifting standard to the hospital
defendant. 204
Two years later, in the Second Circuit case of Reynolds v. St. Francis
Medical Center, a plaintiff slipped and fell on outdoor steps while exiting
St. Francis Medical Center in Monroe, Louisiana. 205 The plaintiff brought
a slip-and-fall suit against the hospital, alleging that the stairs were wet
and posed an unreasonable risk of harm. 206 The trial court applied the
McCardie rule, both presuming St. Francis Medical Center’s negligence
and requiring it to call all of its employees as witnesses to rebut the
presumption. 207 On appeal, the Reynolds court noted that the McCardie
evidentiary requirement was overly burdensome for a hospital defendant
in light of the changes implemented by the 1988 Merchant Liability
Statute. 208 However, the Reynolds court relied directly on LeBlanc in

Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2001); Flipping v. JWH Prop., LLC, 196 So. 3d 149 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2016); Williams v. Foti, 433 So. 2d 406, 407 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1983).
200. See LeBlanc, 563 So. 2d at 316. The 1990 amendment to the Merchant
Liability Statute occurred in September. Thus, at the time Leblanc was decided,
the 1988 original enactment of the Merchant Liability Stature governed, imposing
a burden-shifting approach for slip-and-fall claims against merchants. See LA.
REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (1988).
201. See, e.g., Stogner v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 254 So. 3d 1254 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 2018).
202. LeBlanc, 563 So. 2d at 313.
203. Id. at 316.
204. Id.
205. Reynolds v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 597 So. 2d 1121, 1121 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 1992).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1123. Reynolds was decided in 1992; however, the applicable law
in the case was the 1988 version of the Merchant Liability Statute. See id. at n.1.
208. Id. at 1123.
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declaring the burden-shifting standard to be the proper standard of fault,
stating:
As in any slip and fall lawsuit, to establish a prima facie case
against a hospital, the plaintiff must show that she slipped, fell,
and was injured because of a foreign substance on the defendant's
premises. . . . The burden then shifts to the defendant to exculpate
itself from the presumption of negligence. 209
At the time LeBlanc and Reynolds were decided, Louisiana’s
prevailing slip-and-fall standard was the burden-shifting standard set by
the original Merchant Liability Statute and supported by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in the Kavlich line of cases. 210 Moreover, the legislature
had yet to amend the custodial-liability articles of the Louisiana Civil
Code, so Loescher and its progeny also remained good law. 211 Therefore,
the application of the burden-shifting standard against hospital defendants
in LeBlanc and Reynolds was, at least, contextually appropriate. 212
However, even after the Louisiana Legislature broadly reformed premisesliability law to require negligence-based burdens of proof, courts
continued to rely on LeBlanc and Reynolds in applying the burden-shifting
approach in slip-and-fall cases against medical institutions. 213
For example, in the 1994 case of Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, the
plaintiff brought a slip-and-fall suit against Touro Infirmary arising from
injuries she sustained from slipping and falling on vomit in the hallway of
the Touro Infirmary. 214 The trial court applied the burden-shifting
standard, finding Touro Infirmary at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries. 215 On
appeal, Touro argued that the burden-shifting standard of fault was
unreasonably burdensome for the hospital in light of the negligence-based
standard implemented by the 1990 amendment to the Merchant Liability
Statute. 216 However, citing directly to both LeBlanc and Reynolds, the
Neyrey court stated that the burden-shifting approach was the appropriate
standard for evaluating the claim but failed to explain the applicability of
209. Id. at 1122 (citing LeBlanc, 563 So. 2d at 315).
210. LeBlanc, 563 So. 2d at 316; Reynolds, 597 So. 2d 1121.
211. See Maraist & Galligan, supra note 10.
212. LeBlanc, 563 So. 2d at 316. In Section III.C, this Comment discusses the
fact that the Louisiana Supreme Court never applied the Kavlich standard to a case
involving a non-merchant, much less a medical institution.
213. See generally Reynolds, 597 So. 2d 1121.
214. Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 639 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1994).
215. Id. at 1216.
216. Id.

1310

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

the burden-shifting approach in light of the 1990 amendment to the
Merchant Liability Statute. 217
In the time after LeBlanc and Reynolds but before Neyrey, the
Louisiana Legislature had amended the Merchant Liability Statute to
overrule the Louisiana Supreme Court’s burden-shifting Kavlich standard
by replacing it with a “fairer” negligence-based approach. 218 Thus, at the
time Neyrey was decided, Louisiana law did not support the burdenshifting approach as it did at the time of LeBlanc and Reynolds. 219 In other
words, the Neyrey court erred by relying on caselaw without considering
the legislative changes to the law on which the cases were based. Louisiana
courts have frequently relied on Neyrey in using the burden-shifting
approach without addressing the Neyrey court’s misplaced reliance on
LeBlanc and Reynolds, bolstering the chain of legally inconsistent slipand-fall caselaw through which the burden-shifting approach still exists
today. 220
For example, in the aforementioned Mosely case, the Fourth Circuit
first noted that the slip-and-fall standard set by the Merchant Liability
Statute did not apply to cases against hospitals. 221 The court then quoted
Neyrey directly in applying the burden-shifting standard and requiring
Pendleton Memorial Methodist Hospital to exculpate itself from a
presumption of negligence. 222 According to the Mosely court: “The proper
burden of proof in a claim for injuries caused by a condition in a hospital
is set forth in Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary.” 223 Beyond adopting the Neyrey
standard, the Mosely court provided no analysis as to the jurisprudential
basis on which Neyrey was decided. 224 Moreover, the Mosely court failed
to acknowledge that the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1996 had abolished
strict premises liability in Louisiana in the time since the Neyrey case was

217. Id. at 1216–17.
218. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6 (1990); Piacun, supra note 37, at 216.
219. LeBlanc v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 563 So. 2d 312, 316 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 1990); Reynolds v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 597 So. 2d 1121, 1121
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Neyrey, 639 So. 2d at 1217.
220. Neyrey, 639 So. 2d at 1217; Mosely v. Methodist Health Sys. Found.,
Inc., 776 So. 2d 21 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2000).
221. Mosely, 776 So. 2d at 23. Specifically, the Mosely court stated, “[T]his is
the burden of proof that [the Merchant Liability Statute] establishes, and as such
should not have been used in this case where the accident occurred on a hospital’s
premises, instead of a merchant’s premises.” Id.
222. See supra Part II; see also Mosely, 776 So. 2d 21, 23.
223. Mosely, 776 So. 2d 21, 23.
224. Id.

2022]

COMMENT

1311

decided, further isolating the burden-shifting standard from all other
premises-liability fault standards under Louisiana law. 225
Mosely illustrates the fact that slip-and-fall cases can turn on the
standard of fault applied by the court in circumstances where limited
evidence is available. 226 In such circumstances, courts that adopt the
burden-shifting approach disadvantage medical-institution defendants
without justification. Had the Mosely court evaluated the contextual
applicability of Neyrey and the cases on which Neyrey incorrectly relied,
perhaps it would have adopted the trial court’s application of a negligencebased standard and affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the
Pendleton Memorial Methodist Hospital. 227
As another example, in the case of Terrance v. Baton Rouge General
Medical Center, the plaintiff brought a slip-and-fall case against Baton
Rouge General Medical Center after slipping and falling near an ice
machine in the hospital. 228 In evaluating the appropriate standard of fault,
the Terrance court first stated, “The legislature has not specifically
addressed the burden of proof applicable in a slip-and-fall claim against a
hospital. Consequently, jurisprudence addressing the burden placed on a
hospital is not affected by the statute governing merchant liability for slipand-fall claims found at LSA–R.S. 9:2800.6.” 229 The Terrance court then
cited directly to Reynolds and Neyrey in declaring the burden-shifting
approach as the appropriate standard of fault, again providing no
contextual analysis of the premises-liability law on which either case was
decided. 230 Specifically, the Terrance court stated, “As in any slip-and-fall
case against a hospital, Ms. Terrance must show that she slipped, fell, and
was injured because of a foreign substance on the hospital’s premises. The
burden then shifts to the hospital to exculpate itself from the presumption
of negligence.” 231
Cases such as Mosely and Terrance perfectly exhibit the improper
adherence to precedent by which the burden-shifting standard still exists

225. Id.
226. Id. at 22.
227. See id.; see also supra Part II.
228. Terrance v. Baton Rouge Gen. Med. Ctr., 39 So. 3d 842 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2010).
229. Id. at 844.
230. Id.
231. Id. (first citing Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 639 So. 2d 1214, 1123 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994); and then citing Reynolds v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 597
So. 2d 1121, 1123 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992)).
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today. 232 Both courts misapplied the burden-shifting approach—first
noting that the Merchant Liability Statute did not apply, then citing to
outdated precedent to set the standard.233 While the inapplicability of the
Merchant Liability Statute may have justified the Mosely and Terrance
courts’ reliance on jurisprudential standards, both courts failed to consider
the fact that the burden-shifting standard used in Reynolds and Neyrey no
longer fit within Louisiana’s negligence-based premises-liability
scheme. 234 Strict premises liability is a remnant of the past. Yet, the
burden-shifting standard—a functional equivalent to strict liability—
persists in slip-and-fall cases against only medical institutions as a result
of Louisiana courts’ continued reliance on outdated and inapplicable slipand-fall caselaw. Courts’ misplaced application of the burden-shifting
standard is also rooted in their repeated failure to evaluate whether the
business of medical institutions warrants such an onerous strict-liability
standard.
C. The Burden-Shifting Approach Is Inconsistent with Louisiana Public
Policy
Given the fact that the burden-shifting standard is more stringent than
all other premises-liability law in Louisiana, the standard is improper
absent a convincing policy rationale to justify its use in cases against
medical institutions. Yet judicial policy does not support an elevated legal
burden for medical institutions. In fact, it suggests the opposite. 235 Despite
the continued application of the burden-shifting standard in some circuits,
Louisiana’s appellate courts have unanimously agreed that the duty owed
by hospitals to patrons “is less than that owed by a merchant.” 236 For
example, the Terrance opinion directly quoted this language, yet the court
232. LeBlanc v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 563 So. 2d 312, 316 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 1990); Reynolds, 597 So. 2d 1121; Neyrey, 639 So. 2d at 1217.
233. Mosely v. Methodist Health Sys. Found., Inc., 776 So. 2d 21 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 2000); Terrance, 39 So. 3d at 843.
234. Mosely, 776 So. 2d 21; Terrance, 39 So. 3d at 843.
235. Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So. 2d 958, 962 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Blount v. E. Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 887 So. 2d 535, 537
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2004); Perrin v. Ochsner Baptist Med. Ctr., LLC, No. 20190265, 2019 WL 3719546, at *5 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Aug. 7, 2019); Robinson v.
Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC., No. 18-553, 2019 WL 581804, at *3 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. Feb. 13, 2019); Rixner v. Our Lady of Lake Hosp., Inc., 306 So. 3d 444,
448 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2020).
236. Holden, 690 So. 2d at 962 (emphasis added); Blount, 887 So. 2d at 537
(emphasis added); Perrin, 2019 WL 3719546, at *5 (emphasis added); Robinson,
WL 581804, at *3 (emphasis added); Rixner, 306 So. 3d at 448 (emphasis added).
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proceeded to declare the burden-shifting approach the proper standard for
evaluating the slip-and-fall claim against Baton Rouge General
Hospital. 237 Given the fact that the Merchant Liability Statute expressly
requires negligence-based fault for slip-and-fall cases against merchants,
courts’ application of the burden-shifting standard in slip-and-fall cases
involving medical institutions directly contradicts prevailing policy. As
noted in Rixner, “Surely, the legislature did not intend to eliminate the
burden-shifting approach for claims against merchants, which owe a
higher duty of care than non-merchants, while at the same time allowing
the burden-shifting approach to be applied in claims against nonmerchants.” 238
Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court has never supported an
elevated standard of fault for medical institutions in premises-liability
litigation. 239 In Kavlich, the Court created the burden-shifting approach as
a policy-based rule; however, the Kavlich holding was narrowly tailored
to apply only in cases brought against grocery stores. 240 In the 13 years
following Kavlich, the Court developed the burden-shifting standard in
Gonzales, Brown, and McCardie, and eventually overruled the standard in
Welch—all cases against grocery store defendants. 241 Given the Court’s
supervisory jurisdiction and the prevalence of slip-and-fall litigation, the
Court could have decided to hear a slip-and-fall case against any nongrocery store entity had it intended to expressly extend the application of
the burden-shifting approach beyond grocery stores. 242
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has never applied the burdenshifting standard in a case involving anything other than a grocery-store
defendant, nor did it ever suggest in Kavlich and its progeny that the
burden-shifting standard was to be applied to slip-and-fall cases against
any class of defendants other than grocery stores. 243 Some Louisiana
courts have referenced this issue in rejecting the burden-shifting

237. Terrance v. Baton Rouge Gen. Med. Ctr., 39 So. 3d 842, 844 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2010).
238. Rixner, 306 So. 3d at 452 (McDonald, J., agreeing).
239. See supra Section I.F.
240. See Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So. 2d 282, 284–85 (La. 1975).
241. See generally id. at 284; Gonzales v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 326 So. 2d
486 (La. 1976); Brown v. Winn-Dixie La. Inc., 452 So. 2d 685 (La. 1984);
McCardie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 511 So. 2d 1134 (La. 1987); Welch v. WinnDixie La., Inc., 655 So. 2d 309 (La. 1995).
242. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
243. Kavlich, 315 So. 2d 282; Gonzales, 326 So. 2d 486; Brown, 452 So. 2d
685; McCardie, 511 So. 2d 1134.
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approach. 244 For example, the Holden court stated, “We have not found
that the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the ever-increasing post-Kavlich
burdens upon non-merchant defendants such as LSUMC between 1975
and 1990.” 245 Further, the Rixner agreeing opinion stated, “At no point has
either the Louisiana legislature or the Louisiana Supreme Court ever
applied the burden-shifting approach to hospitals or any other nonmerchants.” 246
Notwithstanding the absence of judicial policy support for the
application of the burden-shifting approach specifically, it could be argued
that public interest warrants some form of elevated legal standard for
medical institutions in slip-and-fall cases. After all, medical institutions
have regulated monopolies on the local healthcare markets, and they
welcome higher-than-average concentrations of physically and mentally
handicapped patrons who are much more susceptible to hazard-related
injury than other persons. Further, medical institutions often market
themselves as cornerstones of human health and wellness, captivating the
public trust. For these reasons, it is reasonable that hospital patrons have
expectations of cleanliness and physical safety while on the premises.
Finally, people visit medical institutions out of necessity, not by choice,
so hospital patients and visitors should not be subjected to risk-prone
environments.
While such concerns are valid, they do not justify the application of a
burden-shifting standard against medical institutions contrary to the
negligence standards to which all other brick-and-mortar establishments
in Louisiana are held. 247 Unlike merchant-type businesses, medical
institutions do not generate revenue by diverting patrons’ attention away
from their walking paths with colorful product placement and in-store
advertising. 248 The Holden court concurred with this rationale in rejecting
the trial court’s application of the burden-shifting approach against the
LSU Medical Center in Shreveport. 249 Specifically, the Holden court
stated, “The economic circumstances which prompted Kavlich, including

244. Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So. 2d 958, 963;
Rixner v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 306 So. 3d 444, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2020) (McDonald, J., agreeing).
245. Holden, 690 So. 2d at 963.
246. Rixner, 306 So. 3d 452 (McDonald, J., agreeing).
247. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317.1, 2322 (2021); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 9:2800.6, 9:2800(A)–(C) (2021).
248. Kavlich, 315 So. 2d at 284.
249. Holden, 690 So. 2d at 963.

2022]

COMMENT

1315

the merchandising distractions and customer volume, are not present in a
patient’s wing of a hospital.” 250
Further, hazardous or dangerous conditions such as spills on the floor
of medical institutions are often collateral incidences that inherently result
from the treatment and care of the hospital’s guests, such as the spill of
bodily fluid in Mosely or the alleged spill of juice in Holden. 251 Medical
institutions should not be penalized merely because patient care
sometimes results in the creation of hazardous conditions on the premises,
especially considering the fact that many medical institutions are not
revenue driven. 252 In fact, many of Louisiana’s major medical institutions
are non-profit organizations. 253 For example, Touro Infirmary, the
defendant in Neyrey; Methodist Health System Foundation, the defendant
in Mosely; and Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, the defendant in
LeBlanc, are all non-profit institutions.254
IV. RESOLVING THE ISSUE: A STATUTORY NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
Courts’ continuous application of the burden-shifting approach in slipand-fall cases against medical institutions has created confusion within
Louisiana premises-liability law and unfairly discriminates against
medical institutions. Accordingly, the Louisiana Legislature should stop
the judiciary’s fall down this slippery slope by adding a provision to the
Revised Statutes that expressly establishes a negligence-based standard of
fault for lawsuits arising out of hazardous conditions existing in or on a
medical institution’s premises.
A. Reviewing the Benefits of a Negligence Standard for Slip-and-Fall
Cases Against Medical Institutions
As shown, there is neither law nor policy in Louisiana that justifies a
strict-liability burden for medical institutions in slip-and-fall litigation.

250. Id.
251. Id. at 964; Mosely v. Methodist Health Sys. Found., Inc., 776 So. 2d 21,
22 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2000).
252. Facilities in Louisiana, ASSOC. HEALTH CARE JOURNALISTS (Dec. 25,
2020), http://www.hospitalinspections.org/state/la/ [https://perma.cc/EPV5-SF
N3]; Nonprofit Explorer: Pendleton Memorial Methodist Hosp., PROPUBLICA
(Dec. 25, 2020), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/720563
965 [https://perma.cc/238D-PUPW].
253. Facilities in Louisiana, supra note 252.
254. Id.
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Some courts have acquiesced to this notion. 255 However, the majority of
Louisiana’s appellate courts have not—creating uncertainty among
litigants as to their burdens of proof, resulting in inconsistent adjudications
of otherwise similar slip-and-fall claims, and sometimes subjecting
medical institutions to costly, unparalleled liability for slip-and-fall
injuries to patrons. 256 To remedy these issues, the Louisiana Legislature
should amend the Merchant Liability Statute to extend its provisions to
medical institutions. Such an amendment would serve to unify Louisiana
premises liability law, reinforcing the legislature’s stance on negligencebased fault by remediating the archaic burden-shifting standard that
slipped through the cracks of the 1990 tort reforming legislation.
B. A Statutory Solution
To properly incorporate medical institutions into the Merchant
Liability Statute, the Louisiana Legislature should add medical institutions
to the definition of “merchant” in paragraph (C)(2) of the statute. The
amendment should read as follows:
(C) Definitions:
(2) “Merchant” means one whose business is to sell goods, foods,
wares, or merchandise at a fixed place of business. For purposes
of this Section, a merchant includes innkeepers and medical
institutions with respect to those areas or aspects of the premises
which are similar to those of a merchant, including but not limited
to shops, restaurants, lobby areas, and hallways of or within the
hotel, motel, inn, or medical institution.
CONCLUSION
The Louisiana Legislature codified negligence-based standards for
premises liability through the Merchant Liability Statute and the 1996
Civil Justice Reform’s enactment of Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317.1
255. See generally Holden v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 690 So.
2d 958, 962 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Blount v. E. Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 887
So. 2d 535, 537 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2004); Perrin v. Ochsner Baptist Med. Ctr.,
LLC, No. 2019-0265, 2019 WL 3719546, at *5 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Aug. 7,
2019); Robinson v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC., No. 18-553, 2019 WL
581804, at *3 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Feb. 13, 2019); Rixner v. Our Lady of the
Lake Hosp., Inc., 306 So. 3d 444, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2020) (McDonald, J.,
agreeing).
256. See supra Section II.B.
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and 2322. 257 In both instances, the legislature took action to reverse the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s expansive strict-liability interpretation of the
Louisiana Civil Code, which presumed a premises owner’s negligence for
injuries to patrons caused by ruin, vices, or defects, or hazardous
conditions on or within the premises. 258 However, present Louisiana law
provides no specific standard for negligence cases arising out of injury to
a patron resulting from hazardous conditions on the premises of a nonmerchant, nor has the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the issue. 259
Consequently, Louisiana courts apply differing standards to slip-and-fall
claims against defendant medical institutions. 260 The jurisprudential
inconsistency causes confusion among litigants and often results in
inconsistent adjudications of otherwise similar claims.261
The majority of Louisiana appellate courts today improperly apply a
burden-shifting, strict-liability standard to slip-and-fall cases against
medical institutions—the very same standard that was the target of
Louisiana tort reform in the 1990s. 262 The burden-shifting standard is
improper under present Louisiana premises-liability law, but it remains
alive in caselaw as a result of courts’ misplaced reliance on outdated
precedent, lack of contextual reasoning, and lack of policy
consideration. 263 Medical institutions should not be subjected to strictliability standards while all other Louisiana businesses are held to
negligence-based standards. 264 To correct this problem and restore the
connection between practice and policy, the Louisiana Legislature should
codify a negligence-based standard for slip-and-fall premises-liability
claims against medical institutions.

257. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6
2317, 2317.1, 2322 (2021).
258. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6
2317, 2317.1, 2322 (2021).
259. See supra Section II.A.
260. See id.
261. See supra Section II.B.
262. See generally Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So.
STAT. § 9:2800.6 (2021).
263. See supra Section III.B.
264. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.6
2317, 2317.1, 2322 (2021).
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